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purpose of this brief study is to inquire into the reliability and
general usability of Soviet statistics of the physical output of indus-
trial commodities, with particular reference to the period beginning
with the Five-Year Plans. Although I shall not be directly concerned
here with the reliability of Soviet indexes of industrial production
or of similar aggregative measures—a problem that has already re-
ceived careful attention in the Western literature on Soviet sta-
tistics,' a major reason for this study is obviously to provide an
additional basis for the interpretation of such aggregative series,
whether the official Soviet ones or those computed by independent
scholars on the basis of Soviet physical output data.
In virtually every case the physical output datum, whether an
absolute figure or a relative (percentage), is revealed to us by a
Soviet source, such as a statistical handbook, an official announce-
ment, a speech, an article, or a radio broadcast. The revealed datum
is what we have. Our problem is to find out whether it is a reliable
representation of the actual event or situation that it purports to
represent; and further, for any given time series of output figures,
how the degree of reliability varies over time.
The revealed datum is not a first-hand representation of the
actual event. Unless simply invented at publication, it is presum-
ably taken, with greater or lesser fidelity, from statistics compiled
for the official use of the authorities at some administrative level
(all-union, republic, obla.s't', etc.). But these statistics themselves
are not a first-hand representation of the actual event. Rather, they
are the end result of a complex, multistage flow of statistical data,
which begins with the primary entry in immediate contact with
some element of the actual event and passes through enterprises,
the economic-administrative hierarchy (trusts, ministries), and a
succession of statistical bureaus.2 At various points in the course of
this flow the data are recorded, re-recorded, reported, consolidated
'See, for example, A. Gerschenkron, "The Soviet Indices of Industrial Pro-
duction," The Review of Economic Statistics, November 1947, pp. 217-226;
N. Jasny, "Intricacies of Russian National Income Statistics," Journal of Politi-
cal Economg, August 1947, pp. 299-322; D. Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Pro-
duction, 1928-1951, Cambridge, Mass., 1954; and A. Nove, "'1928/27' and
All That," Soviet Studies, October 1957, pp. 117-130. It may be noted at this
point (the subject is treated in greater detail in Chapter 5 below) that the
distinction between aggregative (value or index) series and series in physical
units is not a sharp one.
2SeeChapter 3.
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with other data, and otherwise processed, and at any.suchpoint
they may be accidentally or deliberately distorted. As we shall see,
of all the stages in. this flow, one of the most cnicial ones is the re-
porting of output data by the producing enterprise to its adminis-
trative superiors, to statistical agencies, and to certain other entities.
If the purpose of this elaborate recording and reporting activity
were merely to prepare statistical compilations for the use of schol-
ars, or even for the exercise of indirect (e.g. monetary) controls in
a market economy, and if the government that collected and pub-
lished the data had no special stake in the image of its country that
it presented to the world at large, the problem of reliability would
hardly go beyond such considerations as the logic and rigor of in-
dustrial classification, the conscientiousness of the recording and
reporting personnel, and the likelihood of innocent errors and omis-
sions. But, for a variety of reasons, this is emphatically not the case
with Soviet statistics. First, the Kremlin has a monopoly of publica-
tion within the Soviet Union and has compelling strategic, political,
and ideological interests in the image of the Soviet economy that it
presents both abroad and at home. Therefore we should not be
surprised if it publishes statistics that are partial, selective, often
deliberately ambiguous, perhaps falsified (in the strict sense of the
word), and as likely as not misleading. (Of course the extent to
which Soviet statistics are misleading depends on the sophistication
of the reader.) Thus, the question of the intent (and, if one wishes,
also of the moral responsibility) of the Soviet leaders enters into
an appraisal of Soviet statistics. What are they trying to prove? How
are they trying to mislead the world? What follows from this about
the usability of a specific statistical datum? Questions such as these,
dealing with the distortion of statistics at the time of publication,
are discussed in Chapter 7.
But this is not all that affects, in a systematic and perhaps pre-
dictable way, the reliability of Soviet statistics. The second im-
portant consideration is that the Soviet economy is a "command
economy"3—a fact that is no less signfficant for our purpose than
As used here, the concept of "command economy" is akin to certain con-
cepts to be found in the recent German literature on economic systems; such
as direkte Befehl.swirtschaft ("direct command economy"; see Adolf Weber,
Marktwirtscha ft und Sow jetwirtschaft, Munich, 1949, Part ii),zentralgeleitete
Wirtschaft ("centrally directed economy"; see Walter Eucken, Die Grundlagen
der Nationalökonomie, 6th ed., Stuttgart, 1950; 5th ed. translated as The
Foundations of Economics, London, 1950, see esp. pp. 119ff.), and Zentral-
verwaltungswlrtschaft (K. Paul Hensel, Einführung In dieTheoileder Zen-
tralverwattungswirtschaft, Stuttgart, 1954, passim). It is also similar to the
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that it is a planned economy. In contrast to a market economy, a
command economy allocates resources and attempts to attain bal-
ance (in the sense that the inputs required for the production pro-
grain will themselves be produced or otherwise forthcoming) and
perhaps a measure of allocative efficiency, not primarily through the
market mechanism but largely by direct production orders (com-
mands) from the central authorities to the enterprises. The com-
mands for production are generally based on central planning of
some sort and are often supplemented by allocation (rationing)
orders for the more important or more scarce factors and commodi-
ties, as well as by financial controls.
The nature and role of information in a command economy are,
therefore, quite different from what they are in a market economy.
The diflerence pervades the whole economic fabric, and even
reaches deeply into individual firms to affect their internal reporting
and accounting.4 In the case of a market economy, the information
required for its operation consists primarily of offers, frequently not
addressed to anyone in particular, to engage in certain transactions
at certain prices. Output reports by enterprises are not necessary;
if they are submitted at all to statistical agencies or government
bureaus, it is not to ensure balanced (not to say efficient) production
within the economy, but to supply information either "in general,"
or for fiscal purposes, or for the operation of certain controls or the
pursuit of policies of economic stability—all of which are not essen-
tial to the market mechanism as a form of economy-wide organiza-
tion, albeit perhaps quite necessary for the long-run survival of the
particular economic system, or for other good reasons.
In a command economy, on the other hand, the centripetal flow
of production (and other) information is absolutely essential for
the functioning of the system, that is, for the issuance of production
concept of "hierarchy" as a "process of organization," when the latter is viewed
on an economy-wide scale (see R. A. Dahi and C. E. Lindblom, Politics,
Economics, and Welfare, New York, 1953, pp. 227ff.). The earliest use of the
term "command economy" in the English literature occurs to my knowledge in
George N. Halm, Economic Systems, New York, 1951, pp. 310ff., where
acknowledgment to Weber, op.cit., is made.
In this connection, see the illuminating article by IL W. Campbell, "Ac-
counting for Cost Control in the Soviet Economy," The Review of Economics
and February 1958, pp. 59-87, which shows that Soviet cost account-
ing is geared primarily to supply information for control by superior authorities
over management, rather than for control by management over costs. Price
formation is similarly affected; see my article "Industrial Prices in the USSR,"
American Economic Review, May 1959, pp. 50-64.
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and allocation orders, and (what is sometimes overlooked) for the
appraisal of the performance of subordinates by the central author-
ities. The compilation of statistical abstracts is only a by-product
of these functions. Moreover, just as the production commands must
be, as the Russians say, "addressed" to particular economic agents
in order to pinpoint the responsibility and accountability for their
execution, so the reports flowing in the opposite direction cannot be
anonymous.
The analogy between the Soviet economy and a military organiza-
tion that is frequently drawn by outside observers, and which is
underscored by the vocabulary of Soviet economic administration,
can be extended to the intrasystem communication: subordinates
submit periodic reports on the progress of the "campaign"; on the
basis of these reports, the central command issues orders and pro-
motes or disciplines subordinates; and in turn, completing the circle,
the subordinates report on their execution of the orders. The prin-
ciple of authority-and-subordination, with all it implies for informa-
tion and communication, pervades the Soviet economic system from
top to bottom. But authority breeds deception, and commands
elicit simulation. These problems have, as we shall see, a profound
bearing on the reliability of Soviet statistics.
The third characteristic of the Soviet economy that impinges on
statistical reporting is the chronic sellers' market. Its relevance is
twofold: it affects the quality and specification of the goods whose
output is being reported, and it removes or weakens certain checks
on the inaccuracy of reporting. These problems will be taken up at
various points in the present essay.
Although in the following chapters I discuss a number of serious
difficulties and grave problems that arise from the nature of the
Soviet economic system, it is not my purpose to pass over-all judg-
ment on the Soviet economy as compared with the American econ-
omy, on command economies in general as compared or contrasted
with market economies, or on sellers' markets as against buyers' or
"neutral" markets. But I do want to stress that one must not exag-
gerate the specifically Russian or communist elements in these
problems. Rather, given the way human beings react in the face of
authority and in their quest for material well-being, the problems
discussed here arise by and large from the logic of a command
economy and a sellers' market. To be sure, many of the details,
aspects, and nuances are peculiar to the Soviet scene, and some
perhaps even to the Russian "national character," if there be such
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a thing. But the broader outlines of these problems can be easily
recognized in other authoritarian organizations, especially in other
command economies, and in sellers' markets in other countries and
at other times. That the Befehlswirtschaft of the Nazis evinced
many traits in common with those of the Soviet economy is by now
well known, But some of these traits may manifest themselves even
in what we would generally regard as a nontotalitarian environ-
ment, being brought out by the economic "logic of things." Thus,
the British Ministry of Aircraft Production during the last war—a
sort of command economy operating in a sellers' market—struggled
with many operating problems, including that of obtaining reliable
statistical information, strikingly similar to those that we often
regard as characteristically Soviet.5 And even such an "outlandish"
Soviet practice as the classification of perfectly good products as
"spoilage" by the producing enterprises themselves (see p. 82)
had its counterpart in the early postwar years in Japan, where
manufacturers receiving allotments of rationed materials for the
ostensible purpose of production for export would declare the
products "spoiled" in order to be able to dispose of them domes-
tically at higher yen prices.6
I have akeady said enough to suggest that the approach in this
study of the reliability of certain Soviet statistics is mainly one of
economic-systemic analysis: namely, an analysis of the obstacles to
an accurate and unbiased flow of information, given the structure
of plans, orders, incentives, and sanctions that prevail in, the Soviet
command economy, and also given the sellers' marketat is such
an important feature of it. In doing so, I have the bei efit of the
considerable research on the operating principles and characteris-
tics of the Soviet economy that has been accomplished in the United
States and other Western countries since the war. Particularly
heavy is my intellectual debt to Professor Joseph S. Berliner, whose
careful research of considerable insight on the behavior of Soviet
industrial managers has been of great value for this Inaddi-
tion to research by Western scholars, the evidence employed in this
study consists primarily of the public concern of Soviet statistical
and political authorities over the reliability of the statistical data at
See E. Devons, Planning in Practice: Essays in Aircraft Planning in War-
time, Cambridge, 1950, especially Chapter VII.
6Jam indebted to Professor Leon Hollerman of Claremont Men's College
for bringing this point to my attention.
See especially his Factortj and Manager in the USSR, Cambridge, Mass.,
1957.
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their disposal; reports in the Soviet literature of specific instances of
data distortion and of related problems; and eyewitness accounts of
former residents of the USSR, particularly as collected and analyzed
by Berliner. The description of the statistical apparatus and system
rests largely on Soviet textbooks and similar material.
The nature of the evidence, coupled with the understandable
reluctance of Soviet authorities to share with the world at large
such estimates as they may have of the exact extent of the inaccu-
racies in published Soviet statistics, means that our conclusions are
of necessity qualitative rather than quantitative. It is hoped that
they are no less valid or significant for this reason.
Moreover, the evidence is extremely fragmentary, and it might be
felt that generalizations about Soviet industry as a whole and about
the entire Plan era are difficult to make. However, it seems to me
that a certain amount of cautious generalization is not unwarranted
because the relevant institutional and organizational conditions are
quite uniform in all branches of Soviet industry at any one time, and
remained remarkably stable from the early thirties until at the
reform of industrial administration in 1957. The changes since 1957,
as they affect the present study, should also not be overestimated.
(At any rate, since the National Bureau is carrying its Study of
Soviet Economic Growth only through 1955, relatively little atten-
tion is paid here to the effects of the 1957 reform.)
Lastly, this study consciously eschews any international compari-
Sons of the quality of industrial production statistics. Thus, while
this stud focuses on certain shortcomings of the Soviet
statistical ystem, and a few obiter dicta by way of international com-
parison may even be offered on the pages to follow, no judgment is
passed here on the over-all quality of Soviet statistics of physical
output of industrial commodities (not to say statistics in general)
in relation to those of other countries. Such a comparative analysis
would require a much more formidable inquiry than has been at-
tempted here.
Terminology
The usability of any statistical datum for a given purpose depends
on its reliability and its precision. Precision is both quantitative and
descriptive. Quantitative precision is determined by the number of
significant digits in the figure. Descriptive precision, or definitive-
ness, varies directly with the completeness of the revealed definition
of the statistkal category that the figure purports to measure. As
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definitiveness decreases, ambiguity increases. It may be worth not-
ing that beyond a certain point additional precision, whether quan-
titative or descriptive, may be of little value. Not only may it be
spurious, but by imparting an unwarranted appearance of accuracy
it may actually be a disservice to the user of the statistics.8
The reliability of a datum is essentially a matter of its accuracy.
By accuracy I mean the degree to which the datum corresponds,
within its own context, to the actual event or situation that it pur-
ports to represent. (It is, so to say, the of the datum,
using this term now apart from any moral connotations.) Inaccuracy
results from the distortion of data, which in turn may be due to
error, omission, or falsification. The last, of course, may go as far as
sheer invention, "pulling out of thin air." As I use the terms in the
present study, error and omission are unintentional (though not
necessarily random or unbiased), whereas falsification is an inten-
tional act, for whatever motive, by someone interposed between
the actual event or situation and the user of the data.
I shall distinguish between two kinds of distortion. The first is
numerical distortion, where the resulting inaccuracy is in the figure
itself. The second kind of distortion refers not, or not only, to the
figure itself, but to the description of the statistical category in
question. I therefore call it descriptive distortion, under which I
subsume contextual distortion, that is to say, distortion arising
because although the datum may not be inaccurately described, it
nonetheless is placed in a context that tends to mislead the reader
as to its exact meaning. Of course, both numerical and descriptive
distortion may be deliberate, in which case the term "falsification"
applies. While the distinction between the two kinds of distortion,
numerical and descriptive, should not be overstressed, it has some
usefulness, at least in discussion of the process whereby the datum
is distorted. Moreover, while numerically the distinction between
accuracy and precision is quite clear, descriptively the distinction
between distortion and ambiguity is not a sharp one; certainly a
8Someproblems and perils of undue precision are discussed in the pioneer-
ing work of Oskar Morgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic Observation,
Princeton, 1950, p. 25 and elsewhere. Quantitatively, the published Soviet
statistics are often precise enough for most of our purposes, being expressed
in two, three, and sometimes more significant digits. Only one consideration
might be added: arithmetic manipulation of the figures, such as concatenation
of the ubiquitous percentages, should take into account the possible extent
of their rounding, and the result should be expressed, where practicable, as a
range rather than as a single figure.
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lack of due definitional precision may give rise to descriptive dis-
tortion.
The quantitative effect of distortion may be in either direction;
that is, it may either exaggerate or understate the actual event or
situation. When the distortion is numerical and deliberate (i.e. a
falsification), I shall use the terms write-up and
Since I am concerned here only with the individual datum, and
not with a collection of statistical data, selection with the purpose
of misleading may be disregarded as a form of distortion.
Finally, by bias I mean a persistent and significant inaccuracy in
one direction. (No moral connotation is implied.)
As might be expected in a rigidly planned and extremely cen-
tralized economy, Soviet statistical terminology is at any one time
highly standardized, and it will be convenient to abide by it insofar
as practicable.
Industry. By Soviet definition, the term "industry" (prom yshlen-
nost') comprises the activities of mining, manufacturing (including
the production of electricity and gas), fishing, logging, and "work
of an industrial nature" (such as repairs )Thereare several stand-
ard breakdowns of this aggregate. For instance, in the breakdown
by ownership, Soviet sources distinguish between socialist (state
and kolkhoz-cooperative) and, for the earlier period, private indus-
try. Until the middle of 1957 state industry was further divided
administratively into that under the jurisdiction of industrial or of
nonindustrial ministries, and, by level of significance, into industry
under union, republic, or local subordination; since the middle of
1957 state-owned industrial enterprises have been subordinated
either to the regional "councils of economy" (sovnarkhozy) or to
local government agencies ("local soviets"). Another classification
of industry is by branches (power generation, machine-building,
etc.) and subbranches.1' A specific Soviet breakdown is into Groups
"A" and "B," i.e. branches of industry producing means of produc-
tion and articles of "people's consumption," respectively—a classi-
fication that roughly parallels Marx's division of the whole economy
into Departments I and II. Lastly, there is the important breakdown
into large- and small-scale industry according to the size of the
°Thestandard Soviet word for "write-up" (noun) is its near-
literalequivalent. There seems to be no standard Soviet term for "write-down."
10Prerevolutionarystatistics omit the last three categories from "industry."
11Forexample, see A. I. Ezhov, Statistika prom yshlennosti [Statistics of
Industry], Moscow, 1957, pp. 43-50.
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enterprise (see section on small-scale industry censuses in Chapter
3).
Basic (osnovnye) enterprises are those which possess financial
and administrative integrity, i.e. which have their own balance
sheets. Those that do not meet this test are known as subsidiary
(podsobnye) enterprises. Subsidiary industrial enterprises are fre-
quently attached to basic nonindustrial ones, e.g. the repair shops
of railroads, or the mills of collective farms.
Uchet. The important Russian term uchet is incapable of exact
English translation, and has therefore been frequently rendered by
such related notions as "accounting" and "statistics." The closest
equivalents are perhaps "recording," "record-keeping," and "keeping
account of (something)"; I shall use these expressions alternatively,
depending on the context.
As to the content of this record-keeping, Soviet sources distin-
guish three major types of uchet on the enterprise level:
1. The first comprises the keeping of both engineering records
(tekhnicheskii uchet), usually in physical units, e.g. temperature,
pressure, weight, etc., and records of operations(operativnyi
uchet), which cover all day-to-day activities of an enterprise. These
overlap to a considerable extent and are therefore designated
jointly as operativno-tekhnicheskii uchet. Its purpose is to aid mana-
gerial decisions at the enterprise and higher levels.
2. The second major category, bukhgalterskii uchet, deals pri-
marily with value magnitudes and corresponds closely to what is
known as accounting in the United States. (However, as befits a
command economy in contrast to a market economy, there is no
independent public accounting or auditing in the USSR as we know
them in the United States. These functions are performed for the
enterprise by superior administrative entities and various agencies
of state control.)
3. Third, the sources speak of the keeping of statistical records
uchet), which bring together the accounting data
and operational records, as well as some other information. These
records are set up in such a way as to be able to gauge the extent
of plan fulfillment, and they constitute the basic source of data for
Soviet economic statistics.12
12Onthese categories of uchet, see Ia. S. Bebchuk, Uchet, kal'kulüitsiia i
otchetnost' mashinostroitel'nogo predpriiaUia [Record-Keeping,
Calculation, and Engineering Reporting in the Machine-Building Enterprise],
2nd ed., Moscow, 1954, pp. 6-7; and V. Makarov and M. Belousov, Teoriia
bukhgalterskogo ucheta [Theory of Accountingi, Moscow, 1955, pp. 18-23.
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As to the organizational level on which records are kept, the
Soviet literature distinguishes among:
1. Primary record-keeping (pervichnyi uchet)at the earliest
point at which data are generated (tally sheet, voucher, etc.).
2. Low-level record-keeping (nizovoi uchet), which covers all
such activities on the enterprise level.
3. Economy-wide record-keeping (narodnokhoziaistt'ennyi uchet),
which is that part of record-keeping and statistical work which cul-
minates in a set of economy-wide statistics.
Reporting. Another important Russian term is otchetnost', which
can be translated as "reporting," or sometimes as "accountability."
It has the specific connotation of rendering account to a superior,
and generally denotes an upward flow. Soviet sources distinguish
between reports of operations (operativnaia otchetnost') of a day-
to-day kind, the submission of accountmg reports (bukhgalterskaia
otchetnost'), and statistical reporting (statisticheskaia otchetnost'),
the last dealing chiefly with plan fulfillment. As to the direction
and purpose of the flow of reports, distinction is made between cen-
tralized reporting (obshchegosudarstvennaia otchetnost') and de-
partmental reporting (vedoinstvennaia otchetnost'); the latter flows
upward only directly within the same administrative hierarchy,
while the fonner is also submitted to outside entities (such as the
statistical authorities) for incorporation into regional or all-union
statistics.
Statistics. By statistics I shall mean numerical data in organized
and processed form. (In a few places, however, as will be evident
from the context, I shall use the word in its other sense—that of a
scientific discipline.) By statistical apparatus I shall mean the ad-
ministrative and institutional structure whose primary purpose is
the collection, processing, and compilation of statistics. The statis-
tical apparatus, together with the ways in which it functions, will be
referred to as the statistical system.
10